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Abstract:  
This article reveals some of the tactics which lawyers may use when conducting personal 
injury litigation. The research is empirically based by being drawn from structured 
interviews with a cross section of practitioners. This qualitative evidence helps to place the 
rules of tort in a wider context and suggests that tactical considerations may affect the 
outcome of individual cases irrespective of their legal merits. A range of strategies are 
considered here to illustrate how they may be used at different points during the litigation. In 
addition, the article updates our understanding of the compensation system by considering 
the practitioners’ responses in the light of the major changes made to this area of practice in 
recent years. It reveals how negotiation tactics have developed since research in this area 
was last carried out. Overall the article adds to a very limited literature dealing with 
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negotiation and settlement of personal injury claims. The picture of litigation painted here 
runs counter to the misleading image of individualised court-based justice that is often 
portrayed as the defining characteristic of tort law. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In practice the outcome of a claim for personal injury does not depend upon application of 
the rules of tort alone. It is affected by many other factors. These include, for example, the 
skill, experience and reputation of the lawyers, the resources either side is able to bring to 
establish evidence, and the ability of the parties to bear the threat of legal costs. As part of 
this wider picture, the way in which a claim is negotiated also helps to determine its outcome. 
The relationship between the representatives on either side is at the heart of the litigation, and 
the ways in which tactical advantage can be gained is central to whether a claim succeeds and 
how much damages are then paid. One solicitor interviewed for the present study went so far 
as to suggest  
The majority of litigation is tactics rather than law. It’s all about what you 
disclose, … whether you use a particular witness or not, the type of experts 
you choose, … whether you put questions, … which barrister you pick, … 
and whether you issue soon or whether you issue late - that kind of thing. 
EW7 
The importance of such matters is accentuated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
personal injury claims are disposed of by negotiations which are conducted out of court: 
judges determine less than one per cent of all cases.3 The process of bargaining in the shadow 
of the law is therefore very much what tort in practice is all about. 
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However, the art of negotiation is complex and the legal procedures and business structure 
of the claims system adds to that complexity. There is no universal strategy that must be 
pursued for the best resolution of all the many different types of injuries suffered whether 
large or small. Practitioners on the same side may differ about how very similar claims 
should be conducted. Much depends, for example, upon who is the opponent, the actions they 
take, the money at stake, and the point that has been reached in the litigation.  However, 
practitioners will all agree that the negotiating process affects the outcome of each case and is 
crucial in determining how the tort system actually functions. 
This article gives examples of a wide variety of tactics that may be used throughout the 
period of litigation. This breadth of coverage is achieved only by severely limiting discussion 
of the individual tactics themselves; much more could have been said especially with regard 
to strategies which divide opinion. Another qualification to this article is that, in spite of 
drawing upon extensive interviews, it introduces no new quantitative evidence to assess, for 
example, whether the views expressed are in fact commonly held or acted upon. The 
difficulties in relying solely upon qualitative evidence are well recognised: the interviewees 
may not accurately reflect what is happening in the system because they may be concerned to 
project a favourable public image of their role or that of their firm; invariably they will want 
to be seen as reasonable people adopting sensible approaches to the resolution of disputes.4 In 
spite of this, the portrait of litigation drawn here offers challenges to more traditional 
perspectives of tort where it is often implicit that claims are resolved only upon the basis of 
textbook rules on liability and damages. In addition, the portrait updates previous studies and 
argues that the changed environment in which personal injury litigation is now conducted has 
significantly affected negotiation practices. 
Existing Scholarship 
Although the literature on negotiation in general has increased considerably in recent 
years,5 there are only a few empirical studies of how bargaining operates in the context of 
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personal injury litigation in the U.K. Laurence Ross conducted a major study in the USA of 
how tort claims for bodily injury were processed. He published the results in 1970 in Settled 
Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustment.6 However, the book 
examined a system which differs in many respects from that in this country and was narrower 
than the present study because it focused only upon motor claims. In addition, it mostly 
recorded the views of insurance personnel rather than lawyers because it looked at 
negotiations conducted by adjusters directly with unrepresented claimants. Nevertheless the 
book provides a classic study of Ross’s thesis: 
To understand the legal system and the nature of rights and duties, it is not 
sufficient to know the formal rules; one must know the law in action.7 
This approach was a cornerstone of the studies of the compensation system that were 
carried out by the Socio-Legal Centre at Oxford University which began in the 1970’s under 
the directorship of Donald Harris. Together with others, Harris published the results in 1984 
in Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury.8 One of the co-authors was Hazel Genn 
who, three years later, published Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlement in Personal 
Injury Actions.9 Genn found that there were structural and situational inequalities between the 
parties which placed insurers at a considerable advantage in defending claims. Claimant 
solicitors were said to have a formidable task.10 A key factor was whether the claim was 
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brought by an experienced lawyer who specialised in such litigation. The analysis which 
attracted most attention is now a familiar one in the general negotiation literature:11 Genn 
distinguished those claimant lawyers who adopted a co-operative approach in dealing with 
the other side from those who employed a more aggressive and combative style. Whereas the 
‘hard bargainer’ relentlessly pursued matters towards trial and was very ready to refuse initial 
offers to settle, the softer negotiator was reluctant to initiate or even consider the issue of 
formal proceedings and was more likely to be among the two thirds of lawyers who accepted 
the first offer made.12 Genn suggested, subject to qualifications, that more favourable 
settlements resulted from being more combative and that it was the specialist lawyers who 
were more likely to use this approach. 
This conclusion was questioned in an article in 2000 by Dingwall and others which relied 
upon two empirical studies carried out some years previously.13 Using econometric as well as 
qualitative data they suggested a more nuanced approach was necessary. In particular, they 
emphasised that claimant lawyers appreciated that defendants were a varied group: although 
most defendants were ‘repeat players’ and regularly involved in litigation, some were not 
because they were ‘one-shotters.’14 Defendants were not only large general insurance 
companies but also included smaller regional insurers, Lloyds syndicates, self-insured 
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 C. B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement (LexisNexis, 7th ed 2011) chapter 2 and 
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companies and government bodies. Hard bargaining could be less productive in certain cases 
or against certain defendants. Dingwall therefore urged that it should not be pursued as a 
consistent strategy. Instead specialist claimant lawyers were said to be more sophisticated and 
were only aggressive when the occasion demanded.  
The Changed Environment 
There have been important changes to personal injury litigation which have affected 
negotiation tactics since the above studies were published. Only a very brief outline can be 
given here. Most noticeably, claims have risen considerably. In 1988 it was estimated that 
there were 340,000 claims a year.15 In the next dozen years to the new millennium they 
doubled in number. Since then they have grown again by almost half to reach about a million 
a year.16 The growth has been almost all in motor claims which have doubled in the last ten 
years and now constitute more than three quarters of the total. A notable feature is that 
whiplash and neck injuries now constitute most of the claims made.17 Because these injuries 
                                                          
15
 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Report of the Review Body on Civil Justice (1988, cm 394) para 
391. 
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Compensation Myth’ in E. Quill and R. Friel above n 16 chap1. It has also been argued recently that, 
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report/  
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are usually minor ones, the tort system is now even more pre-occupied than it was in the past 
with very small claims, the great majority leading to damages of less than £5,000.18 
In part this rise in claims has resulted from the new ways in which they are financed. 
Conditional fees replaced legal aid 17 years ago19 and the financial risk of litigating now falls 
much more on the claimant lawyers. Until recently these lawyers were able to offset some of 
the potential cost by claiming from a defendant an increase in their fees if their case proved 
successful. However, this has recently been changed so as to allow a success fee to be 
obtained only from the claimant lawyer’s own client instead of from the defendant: the fee 
must be deducted from the damages obtained.20  In addition, there have been a series of other 
measures to limit the exposure of defendants to potentially high legal costs. These include the 
progressive introduction of fixed fees for various classes of work especially for claims of low 
value. Many of these are now processed by the electronic ‘Claims Portal’ which streamlines 
procedures and limits legal fees accordingly. As we shall see, this has also limited the 
traditional scope for negotiation. 
In response to the changing environment, law firms have capitalised on initiatives first 
taken by claims management companies to trawl for clients: they use ‘no-win, no fee’ 
advertising and other methods to pursue potential claimants much more vigorously than in 
the past,21 although they are no longer able to pay referral fees for cases obtained from other 
organisations. Business models have urged that firms specialise and manage their work to 
deal efficiently with bulk claims. There was a move towards specialisation at the time Genn 
was writing22 but it has increased considerably since. Today, firms still are being urged to 
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 Capital Economics analysed 171,000 motor cases settled in 2016 and found compensation was 
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‘get big, get niche or get out.’23 In other words, they need either to become larger and more 
efficient or to develop specialist skills in order to deal with the minority of claims where 
more serious injury is suffered. Otherwise they will fail. In response to such advice there has 
been a series of mergers of traditional personal injury firms. The advice was reinforced by the 
head of Slater & Gordon who in 2014 predicted that just three firms would soon control up to 
40 per cent of all claims.24 The entry to the U.K. of that Australian firm was a significant 
event: it was the first law firm to be publicly listed on a stock exchange and is the largest of 
the Alternative Business Structures now permitted to work in the personal injury field.25 Its 
size and method of operation reflected the changing business environment. 
In parallel with these changes in the structure of claimant firms there has been a 
consolidation in the insurance market. A handful of insurers now dominate personal injury so 
that in motor claims, for example, there are only four companies which share over half the 
market.26 To increase efficiency, insurers have sharply reduced the number of law firms 
which act for them. These firms have had to survive a competitive tendering process to obtain 
this work and they have had to limit their costs accordingly. Another significant development 
is that insurers can no longer be seen as acting exclusively for defendants because they now 
also assist many claimants. This is because of the rapid expansion of before-the-event 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lawyers was founded in 1990. Melville Williams, ‘A.P.I.L.’ (1991) 19 Civil J Q 103. See now ICF 
Consulting Services, An Assessment of the Market for Personal Injury (2016), a report for the 
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 David Marshall, (2013) 157 Sol J October 16. Marshall is a former President of the Association of 
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result of this deal the firm revealed that it had suffered catastrophic losses. Offices were closed, a 
serious fraud investigation begun, and a class action suit was brought by shareholders. By 2017 the 
shares in that ‘alternative business structure’ firm had lost 98% of their value and it was recapitalised 
by its lenders. Financial Times [2017] June 30. 
25
 For detailed discussion see R. Lewis (2016) above n 16. 
26
 Based on the premiums collected in 2012, the companies are Direct Line, Admiral, Aviva and 
AXA. Evidence of Thompsons solicitors to House of Commons Transport Committee, Driving 
Premiums Down: Fraud and the Cost of Motor Insurance (2014) First Report of Session 2014 – 15 
(HC 285). Association of British Insurers, Company Rankings 2014 - Motor. 
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insurance which now covers more than half the population.27 As a result, insurers direct 
injured policyholders who have this cover for their legal costs to go to one of the few law 
firms that have been selected and approved by them. Insurers’ thus control representation not 
only for the great majority of defendants but also very many claimants. This has further 
contributed to the production of bulk litigation within specialist firms. 
Demands for greater efficiency and reduced cost have encouraged law firms to employ 
many more junior staff to deal with the increasing volume of claims. A lot of the work 
involving run-of-the-mill cases is now being carried out by unqualified or paralegal 
personnel.28 They are paid much less than a partner in the firm who typically now has the 
difficult task of supervising a team of junior employees whilst also ensuring that the higher 
value claims are dealt with by more experienced litigators. The paralegals are left to work in 
what has been identified in the USA as ‘settlement mills’ where the assembly line resolution 
of claims ‘represents quite a departure from the intimate, individualized, and fact-intensive 
process thought to underlie the traditional process of tort.’29 The legal process has been de-
skilled and to an extent de-personalised in these new claim factories. As we shall see, this has 
also affected how claims are negotiated. 
We can speculate further about other effects structural changes may have had upon the 
negotiation of claims. For example, to what extent have the financial pressures which 
produced more streamlined processes made it harder to use certain tactics or encouraged 
others? Again, has the greater financial risk now taken by claimant firms been reflected in 
concern to resolve claims quickly to ensure that the firm’s costs are met and that its cash flow 
is not restricted? Consolidation in both the legal and insurance industry has meant that 
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 R. Lewis, ‘Litigation Costs and Before-The-Event Insurance: The Key to Access to Justice?’ (2011) 
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Zimmerman, ‘The Corporate Settlement Mill’ (2015) 101 Virginia LR 129. Standardisation of the 
claims process has developed over many years in the U.K. For example, some of its features including 
the ‘dumbing down’ of staff following implementation of the Woolf reforms in 1999 were noted by 
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although firms on both sides are more likely to come up against the same repeat playing 
larger organisations, it is less likely that negotiators will deal with the familiar local 
representatives of insurers as in the past. Instead the respective firms may be at opposite ends 
of the country. As a result, traditional practice arising from a course of dealing with particular 
individuals face to face may be less common. Is this a concern of litigators? A final example 
of the potential impact of change relates to the greater central direction of firms and the 
increased importance attached to reputation and corporate image. Is this reflected in 
negotiation tactics? Although this article does not set out to provide definitive answers to all 
these questions, it does illustrate that there are factors affecting claims today which were not 
in evidence when the earlier studies were conducted. 
The Interviews and the Wider Project 
The survey involved conducting 29 structured interviews of lawyers in England and 
Wales, all of these being recorded, transcribed and made anonymous.30 Each interview lasted 
on average ninety minutes and in total they produced a text of 258,000 words. The interviews 
were carried out in 2014 by a field worker who had previously been employed as a personal 
injury solicitor for 14 years. Although the interviews were closely structured, they ranged 
over a number of issues extending beyond the scope of the present article. This was because 
the questions were devised to cover matters relating to a wider project which compares 
personal injury litigation in three jurisdictions across four countries: Norway and the 
Netherlands are compared to England and Wales. Funding for this project came from the 
Institute for European Tort Law based in Vienna. In looking at how ‘the law in the books’ is 
translated into ‘the law in action’ and the factors which affect that transition a range of 
common questions were devised to be used for each country. General and specific questions 
covered such matters as the lawyers’ objectives when given notice of a potential claim; the 
main factors influencing whether a claim succeeds and how much damages are paid; the 
pressures that arise during the litigation including, for example, the effect of the costs 
recovery rules; and the effect of procedural reforms such as the adoption of streamlined 
processes for particular claims and the increasing use of judicial case management. 
                                                          
30 By comparison, in the studies cited above n 13 Boon relied upon less extensive interviews with no 
more than 14 lawyers, Dingwall et al interviewed 52 lawyers and Genn 62 in addition to relying upon 
other sources.   
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Therefore, although the tactics used in the course of negotiations were important, they were 
only a part of the larger study. 
Among the interviewees there were 13 claimant solicitors and one claimant legal 
executive. On the other side there were nine defendant solicitors and an insurer. However, 
seven solicitors had represented the other side when working elsewhere and so appreciated 
the perspectives of both. In addition, five barristers with mixed practices were interviewed. 
There were eight women in total. The interviewees had various levels of experience and 
seniority. They covered a wide area of personal injury work. This included high volume 
routine road traffic claims as well as more individual work-related liability although this also 
included large scale occupational disease claims. Some interviewees had dealt with public 
liability claims, many of them involving trips and slips and usually resulting in only minor 
injury. Among the more experienced lawyers were those who had done a variety of work but 
now were involved only with higher value claims. Some of them concentrated exclusively on 
catastrophic injuries. Among the specialists were four clinical negligence lawyers and one 
solicitor who now only worked on product liability claims. The lawyers were selected in 
various ways: most were chosen from personal injury firms’ websites to reflect the need for 
diversity in age, experience and nature of work; others were recommended by those 
interviewed; and a few were personally known to the researchers. All except four were based 
in cities in the southwest. 
The interviews were structured by the use of mostly open questions on individual topic 
areas. For present purposes, the lawyers were asked what tactics they used to achieve the 
objectives which they had disclosed earlier in the interview. This was followed by a question 
asking about what tactics they thought the other side adopted. More specifically (with the 
Genn analysis in mind) they were then asked whether they considered that they adopted a 
combative or co-operative approach to negotiations and why they did so. There were also 
open questions which related to other parts of the project which also produced discursive 
answers that were relevant to litigation tactics. Some of the quotations from the interviews 
below were therefore drawn from a range of responses across the project area, although most 
were taken from the questions specifically asked about the use of tactics. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
This section relies heavily upon the words of the practitioners themselves. The analysis lies in 
devising the overall framework and in selecting the comments. Where space permits, 
attention is especially drawn to whether tactics have changed in response to the developments 
in practice highlighted above. The comments are discussed in the approximate chronological 
order during which tactics might be considered in the course of litigation. 
1. Securing a Reputation 
About a third of the lawyers interviewed referred to how litigation might be affected by 
the reputation of their firm and the regard in which they were held personally. Tactics might 
be used to affect how they were initially perceived in order to influence negotiations not only 
in the immediate case but also later ones. Although this factor was discussed briefly by 
Genn,31 it featured more prominently in the present survey.  It may have assumed greater 
importance because of the changes in the structure of the firms described earlier. This was 
suggested by a defendant lawyer: 
Bearing in mind that we’re coming across – and of course the claimant 
market is consolidating pretty quickly now – the same people again and 
again, how we’re perceived … and standing your ground is all important in 
order for us – in a very large portfolio of cases in the volume end – to 
achieve the results that our clients demand of us. EW18 
Respondents were keen to establish that, although ready to negotiate, they were serious 
litigators and would contest matters vigorously if it became necessary to do so. Reputation 
could affect the procedural steps that were taken and could also set the parameters for 
negotiation. One senior claimant lawyer emphasised that you have to show that you are 
prepared to go to trial: 
That’s why you’ve got to issue proceedings. You can’t just settle everything 
pre-issue and so on. They’ve got to take you seriously. EW4 
Similarly a defendant explained that a reputation for being a strong litigator could bring home 
to claimants and their lawyers what may lie ahead, and thus contain their expectations: 
You’ve got the spectre of the claimant lawyer doing your job by saying to 
the client: ‘Look, I’ve played this guy before, he doesn’t mess about, he’ll 
make you an offer, but I’ll let you know, when he says this is going to trial, 
it’s going to trial.’ EW5 
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 H. Genn above n 9 at 48. 
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Another defendant was reluctant to offer concessions in an individual case if it might have an 
effect upon other claims:  
If you develop a reputation for messing around, then you’ve earned it….  
We’ve had discussions amongst the [defence] team about not taking a 
particular stance on this case because we know it’s going to affect us later 
on in other cases. EW27 
Defendant lawyers were thus aware that it was not only their personal reputation and that 
of their firm that could be at stake; also affected could be the reputation of the insurer or the 
employer they regularly represented. Conceding too easily in certain cases could generate a 
flood of similar claims. It may be that the great increase in claims since the start of the 
millennium was in part a result of reluctance to defend cases vigorously for fear of the 
resulting legal costs. One claimant lawyer reflected the views of several others: 
If it becomes known, as I think it did with whiplash, that all you have to do 
is say, ‘I was in a car and it was an accident’ and really the insurers just pay 
you some money, I’m not sure that that’s necessarily a good message to be 
sending out to the public. So I think insurers have got a bit … caught really. 
EW4 
However, attitudes now appear to have changed. Because of the danger of encouraging 
other claims, a defence lawyer admitted that he was being asked to contest certain cases 
irrespective of the evidence: 
You can have a case where you are sunk … on liability, but the insured’s 
view is, ‘no, we’re having too many claims from this department, then 
someone’s going to have to go to court because they have to understand 
that we’re not just going to roll over on these’. EW5 
For similar reasons there was greater readiness nowadays to defend certain types of case 
irrespective of the firm from which they originated. One lawyer thought that stress at work 
cases fell into this category: 
They want to fight stress cases on principle.... People being ill as a result of 
stress at work is the biggest growth area..... Insurers are very keen not to 
just give in and pay out on these cases so that people see it as a way of 
bringing more claims. So I think there is an institutional element. EW4 
Overall, this could mean that the cost pressures of the particular case could be subsumed 
by the wider economic picture: 
Clients like to really get a message out there that claimants can’t just write a 
letter and expect a cheque in the post…. It’s more getting a message out to 
other claimants that they can’t just try it on. EW22 
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The danger of this approach is that it drives up the costs bill in individual cases. This was 
recognised by a barrister who recalled the well-known general practice of one particular 
insurer was to take a hard line with claims. He thought that ultimately this approach could 
prove expensive. The insurer  
… could to make it perfectly plain to the claimant’s solicitors that they 
were going to have a hard time if they brought a claim against [X Co], and 
it worked in some cases. Some solicitors would think, ‘oh, I don’t need this, 
I want a quiet life’. Obviously the more sophisticated claimant solicitors 
wouldn’t take that approach and they’d be up for the fight and you just 
think, ‘oh well, they’re going to pay more costs at the end, that’s up to 
them.’  EW19 
As well as being concerned about their own reputation, litigators also evaluated the 
standing of their opponents. They adjusted their tactics according to the law firm or insurer 
involved: 
We know which insurance companies are a pain in the backside and which 
tend to be more reasonable. EW17 
Specialist solicitors in Genn’s time were similarly influenced by the reputation of their 
opponents. However, the extent that insurers and defendant firms monitor in detail the 
performance of claimant lawyers has grown significantly. Genn found that insurers adopted 
different strategies when faced with a specialist firm acting on behalf of a trade union.32 
However, since that time the relative importance of work accident claims has declined.33 The 
insurer interviewed emphasised that today there were different approaches for many types of 
firm, not just those that were union linked. Defendant law firms also now place great 
importance on the use of trend analyses to monitor patterns in claims. These could be used in 
a variety of ways. At one extreme they could again result in hopeless cases being fought to 
the bitter end for the greater good: 
Sometimes you have to trial certain tactics against certain claimant law 
firms at the volume end, knowing that you might lose, in order to finalise 
and thereafter implement a strategy that will work in order to thereafter 
bring down indemnity spend for your client for future cases that come in 
                                                          
32
 H. Genn above n 9 at 113 and 168. 
33 Although claims for work injuries in the last four years have increased by a third, there are fewer 
today than when the Pearson Commission reported in 1978. They have declined in relative importance 
and now account for only 7 per cent of all claims whereas Pearson found that they constituted 45 per 
cent. R. Lewis, ‘Industrial Injuries Compensation: Tort and Social Security Compared’ (2017) 46 
Industrial LJ 445.  
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from that particular claimant’s solicitors....  A trend analysis is something 
we focus on hugely now so that we can help to devise certain strategies 
against certain claimant firms. EW18 
The increased use of technology since Genn’s study in 1987 has made it easier to monitor 
performance and establish patterns in settlement. This has had a growing effect upon how 
claims against particular firms are negotiated. 
2. The Timing of Claims 
Although both Genn and Ross suggested that insurers had an advantage in litigating 
because they were the first to receive notification of any injury,34 the lawyers interviewed 
here modified this view. They emphasised that a major difference between the parties was 
that it was claimants who had control over when formal legal proceedings are begun. 
Restricted only a little by the limitation rules which require a claim to be brought within three 
years, claimant lawyers have the opportunity to prepare their case in detail before they notify 
the other side. The advantage which could be gained was noted by a defendant lawyer: 
The claimant potentially can … get their house in order before they choose 
to issue proceedings…. We don’t have that luxury so we’re reliant on what 
our clients have done or not done beforehand. EW18 
A claimant lawyer noted the difficulties that a late claim could cause his opponent: 
Defendants often don’t see a lot of evidence. This is going to be their big 
complaint when they talk to you. … Until the case is issued we have the 
negotiating cards. We can try and prepare our case as well as we can and 
that’s why I take full advantage. EW4 
Another claimant lawyer saw other advantages in not giving the other side early notice of the 
intention to seek damages. It could enable her to be first lawyer to get to the accident scene.  
She advised: 
Delay making your claim ... because once you make the claim, you’re 
putting the other side on notice.... If you felt your case was going to turn on 
the evidence … then you may want to get in there and do your investigating 
very quickly. Very often witnesses will only provide a statement to one 
party and they feel once they’ve … done their job they’re reluctant to go 
through the same process [again]…. It also gives you a chance to have a 
look at any documents ... and that’s been invaluable. I’ve seen documents 
that the defence have claimed they’ve not had and you can say, ‘well, here 
they are’, and the next thing you know, you’re getting an admission and 
you’re settling it. EW20 
 
                                                          
34
 H. Genn above n 9 at 61 and H.L. Ross above n 6 at 94. 
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3. Initial Case Preparation 
A claimant solicitor stated his general philosophy was to prepare his caseload thoroughly 
from the start: 
We do prepare for trial from day one so our case is risk assessed on the 
basis that it will go to court. We don’t take cases on the basis that hopefully 
they’ll settle. EW6 
Another solicitor who also specialised in catastrophic cases summarised what he described as 
his ‘blockbuster’ approach:  
We will get the best experts … to provide their reports. We will then get as 
much documentation from the client as we can or other sources around 
losses …. We will write a letter of claim early obviously just to alert the 
other side and tell them what’s going on … but at some point before we 
issue proceedings, we would normally send out a pretty major pack of stuff 
basically with the experts’ reports plus the schedule [of loss] plus a lot of 
supporting documentation plus an offer, usually....  You can only mediate 
or negotiate from a position of strength in my opinion, so you’ve got to 
show that you know what you’re doing, [and that] you’ve got a really 
stonking great set of evidence to back it up and that they’re in for a big fight 
if they want to take you on. EW4 
In response, a couple of defendants similarly suggested that, as soon as they received 
notice of a serious injury, they would work hard to investigate the circumstances and make 
early preparation for litigation:    
We frontload investigations, so if we think that if a serious incident occurs 
at one of our client’s premises, they would get us in at that stage in order 
that we can amass the best possible evidence, so that in the event of  a claim 
then we have the evidence to hand and witnesses’ memories haven’t 
become jaded. EW12 
Another agreed with this approach and pointed to other advantages: 
By the time the case management directions come along, we can then be on 
the front foot, make a [tactical offer] and we can start to try and keep the 
directions timetable as tight as possible.... So it’s that getting up to speed as 
quickly as possible for those cases that we want to fight in earnest to get 
that competitive advantage against whoever we're up against. EW18 
These approaches contrast with the changed tactics now employed to deal with the mass of 
low value cases such as those that enter the claims portal for speedy resolution: 
We used to spend a lot of time investigating cases and liability.... Now we 
just chuck them straight into the portal and see if the other side simply 
accept it. EW6 
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Increasing costs pressures may not only limit the claims handler’s preparation of the case but 
also how much is known about the accident and the effect that it has had:  
Frankly, the profession is being dumbed down. If you think a case is only 
worth £2-£3000, you haven’t got the time to spend two hours with the client 
taking a detailed statement…. It’s mitigating against that kind of more 
thorough approach which ultimately helps you understand the case. EW07 
Similar pressures affect defendants although the use of modern technology can also reduce 
the amount of work done compared to years ago: 
For lower value claims … we can investigate more remotely – by email, by 
telephone, digital photographs being sent to us – so the onsite investigation 
which was so much a feature of those claims in the past is less so now…. 
You can’t employ vastly experienced expensive lawyers to do the work, so 
you have to get paralegals in…. EW11 
Costs may also limit the quality of the experts now being used: 
I think it’s more of a factory line … [with] much higher use of GP experts 
rather than a traditional consultant with lower level injuries, simply to keep 
the costs down and to be able to turn the cases over…. EW20 
Inflating Costs 
Defendants recognised that their opponents’ case preparation could be much influenced by 
whether they could obtain costs for their work. A particular criticism of their opponents and 
the economic driver of litigation was that unnecessary preparation was being carried out:  
The difference between us frontloading something and a claimant 
frontloading it is that ultimately we’re going to get paid a fee by our 
insurance clients regardless, whereas on the claimant’s side of the fence the 
reason that they are trying to push forward with production and generation 
of documents that don’t need to be generated at a particular point within the 
procedure because they want us - or rather our insurance clients - to pay for 
it ultimately. EW18 
Agreeing with this, another defendant said: 
I think some of … the main claimant firms’ … tactics are to make as much 
money as they possibly can. All this rubbish about altruism is just that. 
They are commercial concerns and they look at each case as a means via 
which they’re going to make as much money as possible and you can see 
that with the bills of costs. EW11 
A few defendants were concerned that the value of some claims was being manipulated so 
as to gain entry to the ‘multi-track’ procedure where costs are more generous than those 
available under the ‘fast track’: 
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I think there is the potential for games to be played in that arena in order to 
get those cases out and into the multi-track…. I’ve seen … what I would 
call ‘creative’ schedules of loss…. So you see items of loss such as do-it-
yourself and gardening claims on volume claims whereas, historically, they 
would usually [only] have been seen in cases involving £100,000 plus 
where there are genuine serious injuries that have impact on day to day 
living. EW18 
As an example of the high level of suspicion held by some, one defendant suggested that 
tactics might be adopted to keep the claim out of the electronic portal and thus avoid the very 
low costs now awarded: 
If you have a hearing loss claim with more than one defendant or a disease 
claim with more than one defendant, it’s excluded from the portal. So it’s in 
claimants’ interests to come up with more than one defendant, and how do 
we know that they had a valid claim against two defendants? Are they just 
saying that there are two potential defendants in order to come within the 
exclusions of the portal? EW12 
 
4. Gathering the Evidence 
Although many low value claims may be processed in a standard form manner and involve 
only limited fact gathering, the evidence that may be relevant to larger claims is potentially 
very extensive. The following offers just two examples of the tactical considerations that may 
then be relevant. 
A solicitor stressed that in gathering statements in an employers’ liability case it was very 
important to consider   
… who you actually approach for your statements. If you go straight in 
there to a foreman, for example, (unless that foreman may be a union 
steward, where very often you’ll get a different attitude in terms of 
providing evidence) you know it’s going to forewarn potential 
defendants.... If it is … a trade union health and safety representative, … 
they’ve obviously got more scope to carry out that initial investigation into 
key documents. So again, it can be finding out who is there, and who is able 
to support, and who is able to look at the documents for you. EW20 
The use of filmed evidence was rare at the time Genn conducted her research and was not 
mentioned. However, several of our interviewees discussed how important this evidence has 
become. In order to discover how the accident occurred in the first place, there has been 
increasing use of closed-circuit television and dashboard cameras. More traditionally, the 
tactical use of surveillance evidence has been associated with covert attempts to discover the 
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effects of the injury on the claimant’s mobility and way of life. One solicitor specialising in 
catastrophic injury believed that  
… on every single one of these cases that I have they will have 
surveillance. Whether they disclose it or not, I don’t know. EW9 
Where surveillance indicated that the claimant’s disability was less than that alleged it could 
be challenged by asking for disclosure of the complete film: 
We ask for the unedited version … because often [defendants] will have 
months and months’ worth of footage which they will condense perhaps 
down into three or four hours’ worth …. They will have selected the worst 
parts to ensure that they’re contained within the footage. They haven’t 
necessarily shown the client on a bad day. EW14 
The same lawyer also commissioned ‘day in the life’ films of his clients to give a better 
indication of the effects of injuries. This tactic was used by another lawyer to counter the 
evidence of a care expert: 
I had a case recently – a spinal injury. He was incomplete, so he could walk 
a little bit and they were again trying to show … that his disabilities weren’t 
that bad. It was incredibly selective, and they were saying things like … ‘oh 
he should get himself dressed.’ It took him about half an hour to get his 
socks on, and we had a film of him putting his socks on. EW9 
 
5. Discovery and Disclosure 
Respondents recognised that knowledge of the rules relating to the disclosure of 
information was an important civil procedure skill to acquire. One claimant solicitor 
explained what she did if defendants did not comply fully with her request:  
I’ve also adopted a tactic saying ‘what documents do you have? Give me 
the full list now’, knowing that I have some of them here. I wait for the list 
to come through and then send them off a copy and say, ‘why didn’t you 
release this because it’s in your file?’ And that makes a massive difference 
in terms of offers. EW20 
However, the ability to obtain important information from opponents in a more informal 
way was also noted together with the likelihood of gaining insights into the case from the 
more junior staff who now deal with claims:35 
Let’s be honest, a good negotiator will ask questions of their opponent and 
… they might answer something which gives you a tactical advantage. I 
                                                          
35
 Genn at 132 similarly found insurers prepared to exploit situations where they were in direct contact 
with the other side. 
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think … owners of claimant personal injury law firms know that when they 
push the work down [to paralegals] that you’re more likely, if you’re 
inexperienced, to volunteer information that perhaps you ought not to be 
volunteering to give yourself a tactical disadvantage. EW18 
 
6. Making Offers to Settle 
The tactical considerations surrounding the making of offers can be complex. If an offer is 
made formally via the court process - a ‘Part 36 offer’ - and later is not bettered at trial it can 
considerably affect the amount of costs borne by each side and ultimately the net payment 
made. The court can punish either party for refusing an offer which in hindsight can be seen 
as reasonable. However, other less formal offers may also be made in the course of 
negotiations and these may not have the same effect. In addition, particular agreements can 
be reached both on quantum and liability issues, such as the extent of contributory 
negligence. There are a variety of tactical considerations in making these different types of 
offer. Which side should make the first approach? When should the offer be made? At what 
level should it be pitched?  
a. Making the First Approach 
Traditionally defendants made the first approach36 and several told us that claimants were 
still reluctant to be first to put a figure on the value of the claim: 
I think a lot of claimant solicitors work under the driver that they won’t 
make the first offer: they’ll wait and see what’s offered, lest they should 
perhaps offer a sum to settle that maybe is too low. EW13 
This was characterised by a barrister as a ‘one way street problem’ whereby 
… claimants see it as positively their role not to respond [and] it’s the 
defendants’ role to settle the case.… That is a well-worn tradition that’s 
been going on with certain firms since time immemorial. In other words, 
you know your offer’s right when they accept it or when they start to 
communicate because normally they won’t. EW5 
A claimant lawyer agreed that defendants were more likely to make the first offer especially 
where there was uncertainty about the full effects of the injury. He also noted that in more 
serious cases they were now more ready to settle early:  
With multi track [cases the defendants] certainly seem keener to try and buy 
the cases off at an early stage, whereas we won’t make an offer until we’ve 
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 T. Goriely et al, above n 12 at 2.7, found around 2001 that defendants made the first offer in 85% of 
the cases in the study. 
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got everything resolved and the injuries have sorted themselves out…. So 
we won’t be looking to make a part 36 offer generally for two or three years 
but we will often find that we’ll have offers come into us from the other 
side which certainly gets us thinking. EW14 
However, another claimant lawyer thought that defendants were less pro-active and could be 
slow to respond: 
If we’re talking about pre-litigation work, I think that on the whole 
defendants are fairly reactive. There are some insurers who will … make 
early offers – and this is mostly in relation to [road traffic accident] work. 
Other than that they sit back and wait for you to do things really. So, if you 
don’t accept that early offer, then they wait for the claimants to produce the 
evidence so they can value it. EW23 
One type of early offer mentioned by this solicitor is the ‘pre-med offer.’ These are offers 
made by defendants very early in the proceedings, often immediately on receiving notice of a 
claim and before any medical report has been obtained. They are pitched at a low level and 
are aimed at removing the nuisance value of a small claim together with its potentially 
disproportionate legal and disbursement costs. Commonly made in whiplash cases, these pre-
med offers have been heavily criticised on the one hand as attempts to buy off claims for 
derisory amounts37 and, on the other hand, as encouraging claims where injury is non-existent 
and thus feeding a ‘compensation culture.’38 
A claimant solicitor explained the difficulties posed when such offers were made before 
the extent of injury had been assessed: 
We’re left trying to advise the clients on the reasonableness of an offer 
[and] … explaining to them that … if there were any complications [in 
recovery from the injury] then there is a risk that you could be under-
settling the claim. EW14 
This solicitor also saw an advantage in certain circumstances in claimants making an early 
offer instead of leaving the initiative to defendants: 
If we think there is going to be some contributory negligence, then 
generally we would like to get in first and put the other side on the back 
foot with a liability offer. EW14 
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 J. Spencer, ‘Pre-med offers result in injustices’ [2014] Law Soc Gazette, 11 March, J Hyde, 
‘Insurers’ pre-med offers encourage opportunism’ [2015] Law Soc Gazette, 18 May. Contrast D. 
Fisher, ‘A defendant’s view of the unscrupulous activities of claimant lawyers’ [2010] JPIL 231.  
38
 Ministry of Justice, Reducing the Number and Cost of Whiplash Claims: A Government Response to 
Consultation (October, 2013) cm 8738. 
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This tactic could not be used when Genn conducted her study because then only defendants 
were allowed to make a formal offer of payment into court.   
A more recent development has occurred to relation to low value claims which is also 
having effect on other negotiations: 
In the portal process it’s the claimant who takes the initiative of making the 
first offer…. I think that’s also led to a slight change of culture that 
defendants kind of half expect you to make the first move now more these 
days than they used to. EW7 
b. Timing the Offer to Take Advantage of Claimant Susceptibility 
Several claimant solicitors noted that defendants were very prepared to make offers when 
they thought there was financial need which might induce acceptance. One noted that an offer 
had been made shortly before his client’s wedding, whilst several recognised a seasonal 
element to offers:  
From the end of October … right up until mid-December, we’ll have quite a 
few offers coming in, just trying to tempt them to settle before Christmas. 
EW14 
Claimant lawyers also thought insurers would take advantage of other weaknesses in their 
clients’ backgrounds:  
If they’re unemployed, they may put forward a lower offer to try and tempt 
the client to settle. They know the claimant may be in need of money, as 
opposed to a high earner. EW28 
The weakness may not only be financial: 
If [the insurer] were to receive a psychological report which shows the 
impact that the claim is really having on the client - they’ve been diagnosed 
with either stress or a depressive disorder as a result of this and it’s clear in 
the report that the client just wants this case resolved - I wouldn’t be 
surprised if we then received an offer very shortly after disclosing that. 
They’re really going to effectively dangle that carrot in front of the client. 
EW14 
A defendant admitted he made use of weaknesses perceived in the claimant or the nature of 
the claim: 
I’m pretty sure that the vast majority of [claimants] have no intention of 
going anywhere near a courtroom and just want what they can get. And 
often it’s not so much what they can get, it’s how quickly they can get it. So 
I do think in the volume claims arena, say up to £50,000, I think that’s a 
key factor and one which any decent defendant will try and exploit. EW18 
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c. The Combined Damages and Costs Offer 
Particular difficulties are caused when the defendant’s offer is one sum which is stated to 
include the solicitor’s costs as well as the claimant’s damages. The best interests of the 
claimant may then not coincide with those of the firm representing him. A barrister explained 
the potential conflict of interest: 
Sometimes they make damages and costs offer all in one, which isn’t a 
proper part 36 offer, but there are inherent conflicts in the interests of the 
lawyers and the claimants: the lawyers want to get paid, the claimant wants 
to get some damages. It’s not really the defendant’s interest as to how they 
divvy up what they’re willing to pay them, so it’s quite difficult. EW16 
A defendant elaborated: 
I’ve certainly had claimant lawyers who will take those offers. How they 
deal with the conflict internally, I don’t know. But if we say: ‘We’re 
prepared to offer you £15,000 and you could view this as £2,500 
compensation and £12,500 costs’ then in doing so you are … helping them 
out with their potential conflict but it still means our client’s liability is 
restricted to £15,000. EW2 
d. The Appropriate Level of Offer 
The amount that should first be offered by either side to encourage settlement was another 
important tactical aspect. A defendant noted that the claimant was in the best position to 
accurately assess the extent of the injury and the true losses. He therefore was reluctant to 
make a reasonable offer at the beginning of negotiations and instead saw the first figure as 
merely the start of a continuing process:  
The claimant knows the bottom-line, whereas for the defendant it’s more of 
a guessing game…. I tend to start negotiations at an incredibly low figure to 
try and tease out the bottom-line even though some claimants might see our 
offer as an insulting offer…. The whole point of negotiation is that you go 
in as low as you can and the claimant’s going to go in as high as they can, 
and you meet somewhere in the middle eventually. EW22 
A claimant lawyer noted the tendency for defendants to make low early offers but suggested 
they had little effect: 
My experience is frankly that it’s never enough, so you feel quite confident 
that, when you do the investigations, you’re going to come out with a figure 
that’s going to be more than they have offered. EW9 
He was supported by another solicitor who voiced her frustration at receiving a series of low 
offers: 
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They come down with a ridiculous offer and they’ll only ever increase by 
very small increments. You’re thinking … every letter I’m not getting paid 
for. I may as well issue it. And they say, ‘why did you issue so soon?’ And 
the problem is … that the pressure will be to accept those low offers when 
you’re on fixed costs. EW10 
Other defendants pitched their offers higher. In defending this practice one solicitor argued 
that making more realistic offers could save costs in the long run: 
Ultimately, I don’t have any reservations about paying what the claim is 
worth, but no more.… There may be insurance companies that perhaps 
don’t like that approach but any payments in damages where they might 
make savings by making ridiculously small offers, I can counter balance 
that by showing them savings on costs by not making these arguments. 
EW13 
e. The Formal Offer under Part 36 
Making more formal offers under Part 36 carries with it clearer costs consequences and 
gives rise to special tactical issues. Again some of these revolve around setting the offer at an 
appropriate level and making it at the right time. One defendant thought 
An effective part 36 offer should always allow for a bit of fat because … no 
one wants to get it wrong by a couple of hundred quid. EW18 
This lawyer also emphasised the importance of making the offer at the appropriate time: 
It’s all very well to do it at the eleventh hour at the door of the court but 
actually you’ve got no cost benefit by doing that…. So our philosophy has 
always been to make sure that we get fighting part 36 offers in early.... I 
certainly don’t advocate that you need to wait to have all of your evidence 
lined up before you do that. EW18 
By contrast, another defendant was not in favour of early offers: 
I won’t make a part 36 offer until I’m aware of the potential risk to the 
client.... [when] we can say: ‘Well, we’ve quantified the case, we think your 
case is inflated, we’re prepared to offer this sum of money’. EW13 
To encourage acceptance of these formal offers this defendant also made it clear what would 
be the effects of refusal: 
I know there’s a mind-set with a lot of solicitors that you never accept the 
first offer given. But if you put that offer to them and you give a reasoned 
approach as to how you’ve come to that offer [it is more likely to be 
accepted] …. When I make my part 36 offer I will invariably couch it in 
terms of: ‘if this offer is rejected, we want the following ….’ I will [then] 
list all of the documents that we want to get … EW13 
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7. The Game of Poker 
The course of negotiations has been likened to a card game. It can be marked by the 
exaggeration of a client’s case and by the use of bluff to gain the desired position. Not 
everyone is good at this: 
I think people have difficulty in negotiating, particularly if they’re trying to 
drive a better deal than they’ve actually got authority to drive. So, the poker 
player – there’s not a poker player in all of us – some are better at it than 
others. EW11 
Not all cards may be laid on the table immediately. Concessions may not readily be made if 
they could be used later to forge a deal. A claimant lawyer recognised that some defendants 
were more prepared to make concessions than others:  
Some defendants just say straightaway: ‘Fair enough, we’re guilty, let’s just 
concentrate on quantum.’ But others regard it as a negotiating tactic. EW17 
Similarly, the use of defences could vary. One lawyer suggested that he would always put in 
a defence if there was any basis for doing so: 
You’re going to put the defence in and use it as a negotiating tool, even if 
you’ve got no intention of actually taking it to trial. EW2 
Another defendant elaborated on the game of bluff involved: 
Even though we and our client may be aware that a case has no chance … 
the other side don’t necessarily know that. Obviously, you have to call their 
bluff to a certain extent by saying that you’ve got the strongest case 
possible but you understand the risks and you’re trying to get out of it if 
you can. You try to sell it to them on the basis that a bird in the hand is 
worth more than two in the bush. EW22 
 
8. Controlling the Pace of Negotiation 
Another technique used to place pressure on the other side was to continually harass them 
into providing various responses. A claimant lawyer noted that with the increasing number of 
claims  
Everyone is overworked and understaffed on the defendant’s side and 
probably the claimant’s side too. So if you’re always hurrying them ... that 
rattles them and doesn’t let them take the case at their own pace and deal 
with it as they want to. EW17 
A claimant lawyer complained of similarly being harried when the defendant made an offer 
that was open for a very short period of time: 
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I’ve had a brain injury case where I was given an offer and 24 hours to deal 
with it…. They are certainly using those different tactics out there to put a 
lot of pressure on.... It means you’ve got to be on top of it in terms of 
evaluations because sometimes you may have to react very very quickly. 
EW20 
By contrast, a tactic also used was to wear down the other side by prolonging the litigation 
and being generally obstructive. A claimant lawyer described this as the traditional approach:   
Standard litigation tactics [were] not giving much away; not admitting 
anything; not helping; not cooperating in terms of joint instruction of 
experts in appropriate areas; and making you do all the running for longer 
than might be necessary. EW1 
Although this lawyer thought these were old fashioned tactics and less in use today there are 
further examples of the technique considered below. 
Several interviewees from both sides complained about the difficulties caused by a 
particular aspect of the uncooperative approach. This was where firms failed to communicate 
or respond to initiatives to settle cases. A claimant lawyer noted that ‘some insurers just 
stonewall you hoping that you’ll go away.’ A defendant suggested that the majority of 
claimant firms were willing to negotiate but that a minority refused to do so: 
There is this one pattern which is: ‘We won’t speak to you. We won’t even 
answer the phone to you. We won’t accept service by fax or email.’  ... 
There is a deliberately designed behaviour at that end. I understand that in a 
fixed fee regime, you’ve only got time to do so much work and still make a 
profit. But actually fixed fee work works best if you can get it resolved 
quickly. The firms that will make money are the efficient firms, not the 
firms that won’t pick up a phone…. I’ve been at meetings where I’m the 
only person talking. I don’t like that. So I guess you develop strategies 
through the years to try and deal with that sort of situation. EW27 
Another defendant thought that there was often ineffective communication not because of 
deliberate obstruction, but because negotiations were being conducted with paralegals who 
were unable to make decisions on the case. Negotiating with junior staff was said to be very 
different from dealing with the experienced lawyers more commonly encountered in the past: 
They are clearly running [the case] off a [tick box] list…. The minute you 
try and ring them and speak to them, they will run like you’re walking in 
there with a Colt 45 or something. And it’s sad in a way because more often 
than not I’m not trying to trip people up in that situation; I just want to 
understand what’s going on. The days of being able to pick up the phone to 
an opponent and say, ‘look, there’s this case - what are we going to do 
about it?’ I’m afraid have gone in my view. You’ve got so many firms now 
where … the individuals who are sort of my peers [are] stepping back from 
the coalface and therefore very often you’re not dealing with them, you’re 
dealing with their subordinate. EW5 
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In order to get the attention of the other side this defendant solicitor also used particular 
tactics:  
You’re doing things to get it on the desk of the supervisor, so you pull 
something that’s going to make your opponent go: ‘Oh My God!’, and refer 
it to their supervisor because you know that once the supervisor looks at it, 
they’re going to go: ‘Right, I’ll see what he’s at’, and they’ll pick the phone 
up…. You do things to telescope the communication. EW5 
Tactics to get a response varied but usually involved taking the claim to a higher level. For 
example, claimants might decide to go to the next litigation stage by issuing formal legal 
proceedings.  
It’s also quite a big step in defendants’ minds, I think, when you change 
from investigating to actually issuing proceedings [when] it will almost 
certainly change … the type of case handler. EW17 
Similarly either side might give up on trying to arrange an informal settlement and instead 
lodge a formal offer. A claimant lawyer thought that if ‘part 36 offer’ was written in bold at 
the top of the correspondence the words always produced a response:  
It’s possibly a psychological trigger to them or it’s in their case 
management systems as a trigger, so they will always seem to treat those 
part 36 offers more seriously than if you just do a ‘without prejudice’ offer 
of some sort. EW4 
 
9. Making Effective Use of Settlement Meetings 
Since Genn’s study the parties have been increasingly encouraged and sometimes 
judicially directed to arrange a settlement meeting to help resolve matters.39 In particular, in 
cases of serious injury involving claims for more than £100,000 a Joint Settlement Meeting 
(JSM) may be set up. Various tactical issues then arise in relation to when such a meeting 
should be held, what should be negotiated and who should be present.  A claimant lawyer 
expressed her preference for using a JSM over other tactics: 
Clients very often like it: they’re involved in the process but you’ve still got 
a little bit of arm’s length…. You tend to get more of the cards on the table 
[and] you get a better idea in terms of the risks in your case because you 
have a dialogue. Part 36 doesn’t give you that dialogue and you have to be 
careful what you put in letters as well whereas when you are at a JSM 
which is without prejudice .… You can be very open what you talk about. I 
think the parties tend to feel much happier. It always gives them a bit of a 
taste of a court experience - that kind of drama - but without actually having 
                                                          
39 Lord Justice Jackson, above n 3 chapter 36. 
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to go through it, because most clients do not want to go through a trial. 
EW20 
However, a defendant lawyer was especially cautious about agreeing to such a meeting 
late in the proceedings: 
Inevitably because you’re in an adversarial environment both parties will 
want to be in the most advantageous position going into a negotiation. If 
you are bluntly stupid enough to allow a JSM to take place within 3 weeks 
of trial, they’re just going to walk in and whatever you offer, they’re going 
to walk straight back out again because they’re at no risk whatsoever. EW5 
A claimant solicitor emotively saw especial advantage in his client being present at a JSM 
because his view of the other side was that: 
I don’t think they have any emotion at all. They’re heartless basically, 
whatever they may say…. When we have these JSMs the last thing they 
want to do is meet our client just in case it tugs on their heartstrings at all. I 
think that they generally view our clients as lead swingers and fraudsters 
who are just laying it on, and they’re looking for that at every available 
opportunity. And I just think it helps them sleep at nights because otherwise 
… ‘What did you do today, Daddy?’ ‘Oh, I just kept some seriously injured 
man out of a couple of million pounds he was entitled to by hoodwinking 
the system.’ EW9 
 
10. A Combative or Conciliatory Approach? 
A follow up question asked respondents to consider whether they took a combative or 
conciliatory approach to negotiations and the litigation process. In part this was prompted by 
Genn’s conclusions, discussed above, favouring more aggression. The difficulties involved in 
relying upon interviewees’ self-labelling in this way are clear,40 but the question did offer a 
way to discuss tactics in a more personal and challenging context. Almost all the interviewees 
saw themselves as adopting a conciliatory approach and acting as reasonable negotiators. 
However, underneath this façade it was apparent that some could be much more aggressive 
than others and that their self-evaluation may not have reflected how they were seen by 
others. This is revealed in several ‘combative’ responses set out above as well as in the 
comments made below when the lawyers were asked to explain why they considered 
themselves to be in one category or the other. Most said that their approach depended on a 
variety of factors including, for example, the value and type of case involved, the extent of 
provocation from the other side, and whether the parties were previously known to one 
                                                          
40
 A. Boon above n 11. 
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another. In particular, whether the opponent had a reputation for ‘being difficult’ was an 
important factor. 
a. The Conciliatory Approach 
This approach was reflected in a comment from a senior practitioner who had been 
involved in many very high value cases: 
Unfortunately you have to play a game and the game is that you start high, 
they start low, and you gradually work towards some sort of compromise 
and you try and be nice to one another…. At the end of the day both of you 
want to settle it. I have had a case where we settled it over a cup of coffee in 
Starbucks, and actually it’s the biggest case I’ve ever had. EW9 
This supports Dingwall’s argument discussed earlier that a combative approach is only used 
selectively by the most experienced litigators, although it may also disguise the use of harder 
tactics for this solicitor previously admitted preparing by using a ‘blockbuster’ approach. At a 
lower level, another claimant lawyer gave her reasons for being conciliatory: 
Most clients would rather settle sooner rather than later. Most people don’t 
want to go to court and are frightened by the prospect. So if you can 
achieve a negotiated settlement which is in the right bracket, the client will 
be happy … and if the defendant thinks they’ve saved something and they 
go away happy, that’s fine too. EW17 
A defendant lawyer emphasised the importance of controlling costs as a reason for 
limiting any aggressive approach: 
As a team, I don’t think we’re combative…. I say to the clients, ‘For the 
sake of £5,000 you could get shot of this now,’ and generally speaking they 
follow the economics. EW12 
b. The Combative Approach 
A barrister noted: 
Some people litigate far more aggressively than others.… They make life 
very difficult for their opponents, don’t agree to extensions, and constantly 
make requests for specific disclosure. EW16 
Genn characterised the combative approach as involving rejection of first offers and the 
formal issuing of legal proceedings, both of which have been discussed above. Other 
examples of combative strategies include the techniques used to create a robust reputation 
and to prompt the other side into a making a response. The timing and making of offers could 
also be seen at times as aggressive, as could certain court applications such as seeking a 
default judgment or attempting to strike out a claim. A claimant lawyer described what she 
called the ‘hardball’ approach taken by some defendants by accusing them of 
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… dragging it out as long as possible, making it as difficult as possible and 
wearing the claimant down. I used to work in defendant work and we used 
to get correspondence from a very big insurer and our instructions would be 
‘take your usual robust approach.’ So in other words you wear them down 
because it gets to the point that a few years down the line, the claimant 
says: ‘I just can’t fight over that last £20-30,000 anymore, I’ve just had a 
gutsful.’ EW20 
c. Factors Influencing Which Approach is Employed 
There could be many reasons for taking a more combative approach. As previously 
discussed, defendants might be keen to avoid a reputation which might encourage more 
claims. Similarly, if fraud is suspected, insurers are likely to direct their lawyers to take a 
very combative approach. The insurer interviewed described such litigation as ‘hard and 
nasty.’ A defendant lawyer agreed that in fraud cases: 
You can make life very, very difficult for the lawyers and for the claimant 
and just try and grind people into submission. EW16   
A more robust approach might also be dictated by the type of claim being made. For 
example, one defendant was particularly concerned about the high costs claimed for the hire 
of replacement vehicles following accidents: 
I certainly tend to employ that tactic with a lot of the credit hire firms 
because a lot of the time … I consider a lot of the credit hire cases to be 
inflated and exaggerated.... Sometimes, by taking a firm stance, you’re 
more likely to get a result. EW13 
Both the problem of credit hire and the incidence of fraud have increased substantially since 
Genn’s study.  
By contrast, a much more co-operative approach was said to exist for clinical negligence 
claims. This was partly because there might be more sympathy for such claimants and 
because the lawyers were more likely to be part of a cohesive smaller group of practitioners 
who regularly came up against one another: 
[Clinical negligence] doesn’t have an aggressive feel to it that, say for 
example, professional negligence in the solicitors’ world has…. Clinical 
negligence still has a more old-fashioned approach because I think people 
should genuinely care that there’s a person who feels that they’ve been 
injured in that process.... You don’t come across bitterness generally 
between the claimant and the defendant. They’re both traumatised and 
that’s a different approach sometimes. EW8 
Even outside the clinical sphere, if the parties were in regular contact, their previous course 
of dealing could help determine the approach taken:    
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When you work in a local environment, you tend to know who the people 
are that you work with on the same circuit. There are certain opponents out 
there who you know will work with you and be very open. And you can 
have that sort of relationship with them as well because it’s to the benefit of 
both parties. EW20 
The only legal executive interviewed found it easier to deal with other non-qualified lawyers 
rather than solicitors:  
I find it’s often very amicable on the phone. I don’t know if that’s because 
by and large I’m not dealing with solicitors. I’m dealing with people who 
work for insurance companies who probably … won’t be formally 
qualified…. I think solicitors are more adversarial. EW21 
Respondents agreed that this amicable approach was taken in settling most claims but that 
there were firms and individuals who deviated from the norm: 
It gets really frustrating where you find a handler - perhaps one in every 
five or six cases - who really takes a completely different approach to cases. 
There are certain defendant solicitors that … the heart will sink a little bit 
just because we know that it’s not going to be a straightforward case. EW14 
A few respondents emphasised that it was actions taken by opponents that were likely to be 
the cause of aggressive responses and the relationship can then be soured into the future so 
that later litigants are affected: 
I don’t like falling out with people, although I can be described as being 
quite difficult…. Most people get one opportunity not to fall out with me 
and then when they do fall out with me, it lasts…. If you’re going to be 
personally difficult about it, I’ve got a pretty able skillset on that as well. 
EW5 
Reciprocal treatment could also be reason for being more cooperative. This was because 
there was concern about what may be done in response to any aggressive ploy: 
I’ve always appreciated that as a defendant you are going to have fewer 
opportunities to stick the boot in to the claimant’s solicitors than vice versa. 
So my approach is to be more cooperative than combative. EW11 
This was echoed by another defendant lawyer who favoured that approach because 
… you don’t know when you might need a favour from your opponent, so 
falling out with them is never a good option…. I’m absolutely certain that 
you get a better outcome if your opponent thinks they’re winning. EW18 
Ultimately, cooperation was generally seen as a better tactic because being combative could 
be counter-productive: 
You just end up with two people at loggerheads and you end up in court. 
It’s probably not much to do with the claim at the end of the day, it’s just 
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personalities. I’m not sure how that can be in your client’s best interests 
really. EW22 
It has been suggested that psychological factors affect which negotiating style is 
followed,41 and this is reflected in a very combative comment from a senior defendant 
lawyer: 
I come from a background of doing things that make me potentially quite 
combative. For instance, I spent a lot of years doing martial arts. So in a 
way when you read around subjects like that, there’s all kinds of pseudo 
philosophical stuff that gets transmitted into American corporate structures 
…. Therefore you can become very good at mind games…. Yeah, you can 
do all the usual tricks….  There are a lot of claimant lawyers who seem to 
run things on the basis of: ‘This is a points exercise and every time I get one 
over on you I will’. Now the difficulty with that situation is – as one of my 
old bosses used to say to me – if you’re going to put the boot in, make 
damn sure your laces are done up. EW5 
 
11. Going to Trial 
A final tactic examined was the readiness of the parties to go to trial. Respondents were 
asked what they thought of the prospect. A majority of both claimant and defendant lawyers 
indicated that, although the threat of going to trial could be used as a tactic, they were 
unhappy about their cases being determined by a judge: 
Cases that go to trial are a bit of a failure of negotiation really because … 
you haven’t reached a view, a convergence on what the real risks in the case 
are. EW4 
An experienced claimant lawyer summarised the reasons for his reluctance to go to court 
and pointed to a difference in approach compared to twenty years ago: 
In the 90s I said you’ve got to be a trial lawyer ... and now I’d very happily 
call myself a settlement lawyer. ... I would far rather a sensible settlement 
than a trial because you don’t have any control when you get to trial: 
witnesses say things you wouldn’t expect them to; claimants say something 
differently; who knows what the judge is going to react like? I think it’s a 
lottery that I don’t need to join. EW6 
An equally experienced claimant solicitor went on to highlight the loss of control he suffered 
if a case went to trial: 
                                                          
41
 C. Menkel-Meadow, ‘Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Realities – What We Learn from 
Mediation’ (1993) 56 MLR 361 at 377. 
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The good claimant solicitor will control the case right the way through …. 
You own a lot of the evidence, you own the client, you own his medical 
records, you’ll own some of the witnesses…. But as soon as they say ‘all 
rise’ in court then you can’t control it anymore, and that’s the trouble. EW7 
Another agreed: 
In a period of 13 years, I’ve had 3 trials. But you ask yourself this – why 
would you want a total stranger making a decision on a case that you know 
intimately when it’s a lottery in a courtroom? Much as it would be lovely to 
have all the precedents that we want, actually we’re not doing this for 
ourselves, we’re doing it for our clients and the best outcomes for our 
clients are probably not going to be in a courtroom. EW3 
Lawyers from both sides were also concerned about the costs to which their clients could be 
subject if they were not successful, especially as those costs could increase considerably in 
the event of trial. 
By contrast two defendant lawyers were in favour of going before a judge. One enjoyed 
the excitement and adrenalin produced at trial. The other saw a tactical advantage that might 
be gained over claimant lawyers with high caseloads: 
I see myself as a trial lawyer because I think that’s one of the major 
advantages that defendants have.… I have not met a claimant lawyer who is 
a trial lawyer. And I don’t mean that as a criticism. Why would you want to 
be a trial lawyer if you’re a claimant lawyer and you’ve got a cabinet full of 
500 files, 480 of which you know will settle? What possible advantage does 
that skillset have to you? None. EW5 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has revealed how strategic considerations are relevant throughout the period of 
a personal injury claim. It gives voice to the views of solicitors and barristers and provides a 
different perspective on the tort system from that usually encountered by academics. The 
practitioners’ views reflect the law in action and, in particular, the pressures that they now 
face. The area of practice has developed considerably since the few previous studies of 
litigation tactics were published. Although many features of negotiation remain the same, 
others have been modified to accommodate the changing landscape. 
Reasons for these changes are suggested here. In particular, it is argued that reform of the 
various ways in which the claims industry is funded has led to a considerable increase in the 
number of actions brought and has changed the way in which law firms and insurance 
companies are structured. This has affected the way in which they negotiate. They have had 
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to devise techniques to deal efficiently with large numbers of claims. In addition, 
consolidation in the industry has led to the breakdown of traditional relationships between 
negotiators: dealing with familiar local representatives of the other side is less common. By 
contrast, the reputation of a law firm or insurance company now features more prominently 
and greater care is taken to safeguard this during negotiation. Similarly, the standing of 
opponents is now tracked much more carefully and tactics have been tailored to deal with a 
much wider range of firms and types of claim compared to when the previous studies were 
published. 
A major factor affecting the tactics used is whether costs are recoverable. Defendants 
complained of claimants frontloading work in order to claim disproportionate rewards. They 
also thought that the value of claims was being manipulated in order to avoid the fixed cost 
limits which played no part in the past. Litigators recognised that renewed emphasis on costs 
being proportionate to the value of claim limited their room to manoeuvre. They suggested 
that cases now were less well prepared and that they were less familiar with the details 
especially where minor injuries were involved. Where low value claims were made which fell 
within the ‘claims portal’ there might be little investigation of the accident at all. By contrast, 
in more serious claims the need to present a strong evidential case remained as important as 
ever.  
Contrary to previous studies, there was evidence in the survey that it was claimants who 
enjoyed the initial tactical advantage. This was because they were able to prepare their cases 
thoroughly before giving defendants first notice of the claim. Although there was much 
support for the traditional view that it was for defendants to make the first offer, it was 
suggested that this culture is beginning to change partly because claimants are now expected 
to take the initiative in smaller claims. Earlier studies emphasised that defendants could take 
advantage of various weaknesses in both claimants and their lawyers and this was further 
illustrated here. There has always been disagreement concerning the appropriate level at 
which an offer should first be made. However, the earlier studies did not discuss two types of 
offer now being made by defendants: the ‘pre-med’ attempt to dispose of a claim at a very 
early stage, and the combined offer which does not differentiate costs from damages. 
It has always been important to get information from the other side so as to be better able 
to evaluate the strength of the case. However, the deskilling of the industry in recent years 
has resulted in many cases now being dealt with by paralegals. More experienced litigators 
may more easily take advantage of their junior opponents by inducing them to reveal more of 
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their case than they should. To counteract this, junior staff may be instructed to avoid 
entering into dialogue because they lack authority or wider understanding of the issues. This 
has led to the use of various tactics to gain access to more senior lawyers who are in a 
position to make the decisions needed on a case. The channels of communication have been 
restricted by the more impersonal arrangements which characterise the way in which many 
firms now operate. Techniques have therefore been developed to counter this. 
Although the traditional defence tactic of delay was noted in the survey as part of a 
strategy to wear down the other side, it did not figure prominently. More widely recognised 
was the need to dispose of claims quickly and at low cost. Harrying the other side into a 
favourable settlement where it is suspected that they are already under pressure of work is a 
traditional strategy. However, there may now be more opportunity to use this tactic because 
of increasing pressures resulting from the need to process bulk claims. When considering 
whether it was better to adopt such a combative approach or to be more conciliatory there 
was evidence in the survey to support Dingwall’s view that experienced litigators are 
selective in the techniques they employ. Interviewees discussed the difficulties that could be 
caused by the more aggressive approach advocated by Genn. 
 Overall, the experience of those in practice clearly reveals that the resolution of claims is 
not determined only by the rules of tort but is affected by many other factors and, among 
these, the tactical skill of the litigator can be key. In response to the changing structure of 
personal injury litigation these negotiation tactics continue to develop. They are an integral 
component of a bureaucratic institutional regime presently dominated by concerns about 
costs and efficiency. The picture of litigation painted here runs counter to the misleading 
image of individualised court-based justice that is often portrayed as the defining 
characteristic of tort law. 
